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Abstract 
This paper develops an empirically testable model that is closely related to theoretical model 
for style switching behavior of Barberis and Shleifer (2003). We implement this model to 
examine the style switching behavior of US domestic equity mutual fund managers. Using 
monthly data for 2,044 mutual funds over the period 1961-2010, we find strong evidence for 
style switching behavior: on average nearly 53% of the funds in our sample engage in style 
switching. Overall, we find that growth funds tend to behave more as positive feedback 
(momentum) traders, whereas value funds tend to behave more as negative feedback 
(contrarian) traders. Linking the style switching behavior to fund characteristics, we typically 
find that funds that engage more aggressively in style switching tend to be younger and have 
higher total expense ratios. Linking the style switching behavior to risk-adjusted 
performance, we find no evidence of the ability of style switching to generate positive alpha.    
 
 
 
JEL Codes: C22; C58; G11 
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1. Introduction 
One of the great success stories in finance is the development of the mutual fund industry. 
This industry has seen tremendous growth in the past decades, both in terms of invested 
capital and number of funds. With this enormous growth in number and diversity, many 
funds classify themselves into investment styles to provide investors with some information 
on the asset allocation of the fund. These styles have flown out of the popularity of certain 
investment strategies among mutual fund investors, such as growth or value stocks and small 
or large cap stocks (Teo and Woo, 2004). Given that these strategies are selected for their 
perceived ability to produce positive alpha, pursuing such a strategy should play a major role 
in determining the returns that a fund produces from following the strategy. However, as 
Barberis and Shleifer (2003) point out, the returns to particular styles are not constant and can 
be thought of as following a life cycle, where returns may go from outperforming initially to 
underperforming as market conditions change or the characteristic is priced out of the market. 
As such, returns for funds identifying with a particular style will be driven, to a large degree, 
by the performance of the style.  
 
Of interest is the effect that such changes in style performance have on funds that are 
committed to a particular style. Competition between mutual funds for fund flow is fierce and 
is largely driven by the recent performance of the fund (Sirri and Tufano, 1998). As a result, 
there are considerable incentives for funds to outperform other funds within the same asset 
style.
1
 As fund returns are largely driven by the proclaimed investment style of the fund, one 
way to achieve outperformance is by strategically (and temporarily) deviating from the 
                                                          
1
Brown, Harlow, and Starks (1996), for instance, show that mutual funds engage in so-called tournament 
behavior, where funds take on additional risks in later evaluation periods if they are being outperformed by 
peers.  
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proclaimed investment style and increasing exposure to styles that are expected to perform 
better. This has become known as style timing or style switching. 
 
In this paper, we examine the style switching behavior of US mutual fund managers using the 
framework of Barberis and Shleifer (2003). Barberis and Shleifer (2003) propose a 
theoretical model of style investing, where individual investors classify assets into styles and 
allocate their investments at the style level. Barberis and Shleifer (2003) further propose a 
mechanism of how investors allocate money to particular investment styles and suggest that 
investor act as feedback traders, comparing the relative past performance of the different 
investment styles. This model can explain several stylized facts observed in financial 
markets, such as style momentum and excess comovement of assets within a style. The 
empirical predictions of the model proposed by Barberis and Shleifer (2003) have been 
validated by several studies, e.g. Teo and Woo (2004) and Froot and Teo (2008). However, 
we are not aware of any study that estimates an empirical model along the lines of Barberis 
and Shleifer (2003). Based on Froot and Teo (2008), who find that institutional investors also 
allocate more at the style level than at the individual stock level, we postulate that fund 
managers display similar behavior as individual investors in terms of their asset allocation to 
different styles, and acting as feedback traders. As such, we connect to several lines of 
literature, such as style investing, style switching, as well as and investor behavior. 
 
We implement the model of Barberis and Shleifer (2003) empirically using the framework 
proposed by Brock and Hommes (1997). Brock and Hommes (1997) consider a market for a 
single asset, where investors can switch between different trading strategies over time 
conditional on their relative performance in recent periods. Switching between these 
strategies occurs by means of a multinomial choice function. This function has several 
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desirable features. First, it introduces continuous time-varying exposures to different 
investment styles and therefore allows us to modify a model with static exposures into a 
dynamic one. Second, this function is very flexible and can include any variable that may 
trigger fund managers to change their investment style. We use relative past performance, 
following Barberis and Shleifer (2003) and Brock and Hommes (1998), to assess whether 
fund managers engage in feedback trading. Third, this function leads to a parsimonious 
model specification, which (in the simplest specification) only consumes one additional 
degree of freedom compared with a static specification.  
 
We use the survivorship-free CRSP mutual fund database over the period December 1961-
September 2010 to examine the switching behavior in US domestic equity funds. We classify 
funds into different styles based on their Lipper Classification code based on size (Large, 
Multi, Mid, and Small cap) and value-growth orientation (Value, Centre, and Growth). This 
produces a 4 × 3 matrix of 12 different styles. To assess the switching behavior of fund 
managers, we obtain four benchmark portfolios/styles: large-value, small-value, large-
growth, and small-growth from Kenneth French’s website.2 The selection of these four styles 
allows us to examine the switching behavior of fund managers in both the size and value-
growth dimensions jointly and separately.  
 
We find strong evidence for feedback-induced style switching in our sample, over 50% of the 
funds in our most basic specification. These results corroborate the findings of Froot and Teo 
(2008), who also find strong support for style-level trading by US domestic equity fund 
managers. Interestingly, we find that fund managers not only act as positive feedback or 
                                                          
2
Data are available from http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/index.html. The selection of 
these four styles allows for switching in the size and value-growth dimension.  
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momentum traders (as suggested by Barberis and Shleifer, 2003), but there is also a 
considerable number of fund managers that act as negative feedback or contrarian traders.
3
 
This findings has also been observed in the trading behavior of individual investors in index 
funds (Goetzmann and Massa, 2002) and style funds (Blackburn et al., 2011), but to date has 
not been documented in the trading behavior of fund managers.  
 
Consistent with Froot and Teo (2008) and along the lines of Barberis and Shleifer (2003), we 
find strong support for the existence of so-called twin styles,
4
 where investors switch between 
styles at opposite ends of the spectrum. For the funds that engage in style switching, the 
majority tends to do so in both the value-growth and the size dimension. 
 
In addition, we find that the style switching behavior, i.e. being a positive or negative 
feedback trader highly depends on the investment style, where managers of growth funds 
tend to base their switching strategy on a positive feedback rule (i.e. increasing exposure to 
styles that have performed relatively well in the recent past), whereas managers of value 
funds tend to base their switching strategy on a negative feedback rule (i.e. increasing 
exposure to styles that have performed relatively poor in the recent past). This has been 
observed in the trading behavior of individual investors (Blackburn et al., 2011) but has not 
yet been documented in the behavior of institutional investors. 
 
When we examine the relationship between fund characteristics and switching behavior in a 
cross-sectional test, we find that younger mutual funds and mutual funds with higher total 
                                                          
3
We follow Goetzmann and Massa (2002) in our definitions of momentum and contrarian traders, where a 
momentum trader is defined as a trader who buys after a recent price increase and a contrarian trader buys after 
a recent price decrease.  
4
Twin styles refer to the asset allocation decision, where an increase in the allocation to, say, value stocks is 
financed by a decrease in the allocation to its twin style, growth stocks, etc.  
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expense ratios engage in more aggressive switching behavior. For funds that switch 
aggressively in the size dimension, we also find a significantly positive relationship with the 
turnover of the fund.   
 
Finally, we evaluate whether style switching leads to increased outperformance for mutual 
funds.
5
 We do this by obtaining risk-adjusted outperformance (alpha) from the Carhart (1997) 
4-factor model and regress this alpha on the degree by which funds switch and several other 
fund characteristics. Consistent with Brown et al. (2011), we find that style switching does 
not lead to outperformance. We do, however, find that when funds that apply a positive 
feedback rule in the “short run” (1 to 6 months), there is no significant impact on alpha. 
However, when fund managers apply such a strategy in the “long run” (7 to 12 months) there 
is a significant deterioration in outperformance. In contrast, fund managers that apply a 
negative feedback trading rule in the “short run” see a significant deterioration in 
outperformance, whereas those that apply such a strategy in the “long run” see no effect on 
outperformance.  
 
Our work is related to several empirical studies on style investing. It closely relates to Froot 
and Teo (2008), who examine style investing for institutional investors (US domestic equity 
funds) and show that institutional investors indeed allocate their investments at the style 
level. They also provide empirical evidence for allocations being made according to the 
“twin-styles” conjecture of Barberis and Shleifer (2003), where increased allocations towards 
                                                          
5
Several studies have examined style timing in mutual funds, however, evidence of whether this style timing is 
profitable is mixed. For example, Swinkels and Tjong-A-Tjoe (2007) examine three styles, market timing, 
value-growth and size, and find profitable switching with regards to market timing and value-growth but not 
size. Budiono and Martens (2009) test a model with all three styles, market timing, value-growth and size, and 
find that managers that time styles generate significant outperformance. Grinblatt et al. (1995) find 
outperformance of momentum traders compared to other funds. By contrast, Brown, Harlow, and Zhang (2011) 
shows that funds switch aggressively, i.e. have high style volatility, underperform relative to fund with less style 
volatility on a risk adjusted basis.  
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small caps tend to be financed by decreased allocations towards large caps, etc. We confirm 
this finding of Froot and Teo (2008) and extend their work by showing that fund managers 
engage in twin style trading either as positive or negative feedback traders. This largely 
depends on the investment style of the fund.  
 
In addition, our paper relates to Brown et al. (2011) who study style switching (measured by 
style volatility) and relate this to risk-adjusted outperformance of mutual funds. In line with 
Brown et al. (2011), we confirm that funds that switch aggressively between styles have 
lower risk adjusted performance. We extend their work by showing that style volatility can be 
explained by positive and negative feedback trading and show that both these strategies have 
a different impact on risk adjusted outperformance (positive feedback trading being worse 
when used with longer look back periods and negative feedback trading being worse when 
used with shorter look back periods). Wermers (2012) further notes that style drift, for a 
significant part, is caused by active management. In addition, Wermers (2012) finds that 
managers tend to be “style chasers”; this is in line with our findings of feedback trading at the 
style level. 
 
Finally, this paper is closely related to several studies on investor behaviour (i.e. feedback 
trading). An important contribution in this respect comes from Grinblatt, Titman and 
Wermers (1995), who find that 77% of mutual funds have a tendency to buy past winning 
stocksBange (2000) shows that stock portfolio adjustments of individual investors reflect past 
market movements, consistent with positive feedback trading. In addition, Keim and 
Madhaven (1995) document both momentum and contrarian trading by institutional 
investors. Choe, Kho, and Stulz (1999) and Froot, O’Connell, and Seasholes (2001) report 
feedback trading by institutional investors at the country level. Goetzmann and Massa (2002) 
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examine the trading behaviour of individual investors in index funds and find that some 
investors act as positive feedback traders (who they label ‘momentum traders’) and some as 
negative feedback traders (who they label ‘contrarian traders’). In an extension, Blackburn et 
al. (2011) study the trading behaviour of individual investors in style and multi-style funds 
(value, growth and value-growth funds). They find that investors adopt different trading 
strategies depending on the characteristics of the assets being traded, where growth investors 
tend to follow momentum buy strategies and value investors tend to follow a contrarian buy 
strategy. We contribute to this literature by showing that institutional investors also follow 
momentum and contrarian trading strategies, and, in line with Blackburn et al. (2011) we find 
that managers of growth funds follow more momentum strategies, whereas managers of value 
funds follow more contrarian strategies.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents our feedback trading 
model. In Section 3, we explain the data and methodology applied to estimate the model, and 
Section 4 presents the results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Model 
 
Barberis and Shleifer (2003) propose a model of style investing, where the market is 
populated by investors who can switch between investment styles based on the past relative 
performance of these styles (referred to as switchers) and fundamental traders, who act as 
arbitrageurs. In this section, we develop an empirically testable model along the lines of 
Barberis and Shleifer (2003), where, instead of individual investors, mutual fund managers 
switch between investment styles based on the styles’ relative past performance. 
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According to Barberis and Shleifer (2003), switchers allocate more capital to a particular 
style if it performed relatively well in the recent past and finance this by allocating less to 
styles with relatively poor past performance. These switchers are assumed to have a specific 
look-back period over which they compare the relative performance of the different 
investment styles. They further have a specific degree of style persistence (i.e. how sensitive 
they are to differences in relative past performances of the investment styles). A further 
feature is that although investors are willing to switch between styles, they are less willing to 
switch between asset classes, i.e. investors may be willing to switch between value and 
growth, but are less willing to switch between, e.g., equities and bonds. This implies that the 
switching between styles is mostly self-financed within a specific asset class. Finally, 
Barberis and Shleifer (2003) suggest that switchers choose to switch between so-called twin-
styles, where an increased allocation to growth stocks is financed by a decreased allocation to 
value stocks and an increased allocation to small-cap stocks is financed by a decreased 
allocation to large-cap stocks, etc.  
 
We empirically implement the model of Barberis and Shleifer (2003) using a discrete choice 
model along the lines of Manski and McFadden (1981) and concepts of the adaptive rational 
equilibrium framework proposed by Brock and Hommes (1997). Brock and Hommes (1997) 
propose a model where economic agents use predictors (which are functions of past 
information) and choose between these predictors using a discrete choice model, selecting the 
predictor (or putting more faith in the predictor) that has produced the highest profit or the 
lowest forecast error in the recent past. This generates a dynamics where, over time, agents 
switch between different predictors and adjust their demand for assets accordingly.
6
 The 
                                                          
6
See Brock and Hommes (1998) for the complex dynamics that such a model can generate in asset prices.    
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degree to which these agents switch between different predictors is controlled by a so-called 
intensity of choice parameter, and captures the agents’ sensitivity to differences in the profits 
or forecast errors of the different predictors. 
 
At each point in time, fund managers examine the past performance of K different investment 
styles, where k = 1, …, K. We define the past performance of style k as, 
 
∑
1
1
J
j
k
jt
k
t r

  ,       (1) 
 
where ktr is the return on investment style k in period t, 
k
it 1  is the past performance measure 
of investment style k in period t – 1, and j is the number of periods that the fund manager 
looks back ( j = 1, …, J).7  
 
Following Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998), we assume that the switching between styles 
follows a multinomial switching rule which compares the relative performance of the various 
investment styles. According to this switching rule, the weights that a manager i puts on 
investment style k is defined as  
 







kl
k
t
l
ti
k
k
ti
k
tik
titw
)}(exp{1
1
)}(exp{
)}(exp{
111
1
1|


,         (2) 
 
                                                          
7
Barberis and Shleifer (2003) use a geometric decay process to capture the memory of investors. We apply a 
discrete measure following Blackburn et al. (2011). 
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where 
k
titw 1|   is the weight fund manager i puts on strategy k at time t, conditional on time t – 
1 information, and γi  is the intensity of choice parameter, which captures the manager’s 
sensitivity to the past profits of different investment styles and determines the aggressiveness 
by which the fund manager switches between different investment styles. For instance, if i = 
0, the fund manager does not respond to differences in relative profitability, and in this case 
kk
tit ww 1| . At the other extreme, if |i|  the fund manager will fully allocate his 
investments to the style that has had the highest relative performance. A positive value for γi 
indicates that the fund manager puts more weight on the style that performed relatively well 
in the recent past and therefore behaves as a positive feedback (momentum) trader. A 
negative value for γi indicates that the fund manager acts as a negative feedback (contrarian) 
trader.
8
  
 
The switching rule defined in Equation (2) has several empirical advantages. First, it ensures 
that weights add up to unity. In other words, if a certain style performs better than another, 
capital is added to the former at the expense of the latter (this conforms with Barberis and 
Shleifer (2003), who suggest that the switching between styles is self-financed within a 
specific asset class). Second, the multinomial switching rule guarantees that each weight is 
bounded between zero and one, implying that fund managers cannot switch from a long to a 
short position and vice versa. This is a reasonable assumption as we are examining US 
domestic equity funds, which generally only enter into long positions.
9
  
 
                                                          
8
See also Goetzmann and Massa (2002) and Blackburn et al. (2011) who use a similar definition of momentum 
and contrarian traders and identify the presence of both types of traders among individual investors.  
9
In addition, this specification only consumes one additional degree of freedom whereas several alternatives 
typically consume one additional degree of freedom per style; see e.g. Swinkels and Tjong-a-Tjoe (2007). 
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Based on the stated investment style of the fund and the past performance of all styles, the 
fund manager allocates capital. The return of the fund can be explained by the returns on the 
different styles and the exposures the fund manager has to each investment style, i.e.,  
 
,
1
1| it
K
k
k
t
k
i
k
titiit rwr   

               (3) 
 
where rit is the return of fund i at time t, αi captures the out- or underperformance over the 
investment styles, and ki  captures the unconditional exposure to each investment style k. 
We include unconditional exposures in this equation as fund managers typically classify 
themselves into a particular investment style. For example, if a fund classifies itself as a 
growth fund, then we expect that, unconditionally, there will be a greater exposure to the 
growth investment style than to other styles. Including ki  in Equation (3) therefore allows a 
fund to take an unconditional exposure to its stated investment style, whereas 
k
titw 1|   allows 
for deviations from these unconditional exposures.  
 
3. Data 
 
We estimate the model presented in Section 2 using data from the CRSP Mutual Fund 
Database. This is a survivorship bias free database that contains monthly mutual fund data 
from 1961 onwards. Our data run from December 1961 to September 2010. We collect data 
for retail funds with more than 10mln USD assets under management that have a Domestic 
Equity focus and exclude Index tracking funds. We remove funds with less than 36 
observations to ensure that we can obtain meaningful estimates of our coefficients. Before 
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estimating the model, we classify funds into investment styles based on the Lipper 
classification code. We focus on twelve styles: large cap value equity (LCVE); large cap core 
equity (LCCE); large cap growth equity (LCGE); multi cap value equity (MLVE); multi cap 
core equity (MLCE); multi cap growth equity (MLGE); mid cap value equity (MCVE); mid 
cap core equity (MCCE); mid cap growth equity (MCGE); small cap value equity (SCVE); 
small cap core equity (SCCE); small cap growth equity (SCGE). Next, we check whether a 
fund’s investment style is consistent with its Lipper classification. To do this we follow 
Annaert and van Campenhout (2007). For each fund, we estimate a regression of the fund’s 
excess returns on the excess returns of the market, the SMB factor and the HML factor.
10
 For 
this regression, we require the R
2
 to be at least 50%, and we require the factor loadings to be 
consistent with the fund style (i.e. positive exposure to the excess market return, and a 
positive loading on SMB if the fund classifies itself as small cap, or a negative loading if it 
classifies itself as large cap, etc.). This leaves us with 2,044 unique US domestic equity 
funds.
11
   
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
In Table 1, we report summary statistics for the mutual funds in our sample. As can be seen, 
all fund types are well represented, with mid cap value equity having the least number of 
funds in the sample (96) and multi cap centre equity having the greatest number of funds in 
the sample (326). The median average return shows considerable variation over the various 
investment styles with large cap growth equity having the lowest average return per month of 
0.530% (about 6.5% p.a.), and small cap centre equity having the highest average return of 
                                                          
10We use the data provided on Kenneth French’s website. 
11
We also filter all duplicate funds from our sample. Typically, these are identical funds but with different fee 
structures (A, B, C funds). 
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1.024% per month (about 13% p.a.). The pattern in returns clearly reveals the presence of a 
size effect, where small cap funds generally outperform larger cap funds. The growth effect is 
less pronounced in this table, in two of the size classes (large and mid cap) value outperforms 
growth, while it is the reverse in the other two size classes. The standard deviations also show 
considerable variation over the different investment styles, and we generally find that the 
investment styles with higher risk also yield higher average returns. Minimum and maximum 
values reveal that returns can vary widely over time, with a lowest minimum return of -
26.89% and a highest maximum return of 20.71%. These numbers also highlight that there is 
some negative skewness in our data. The last column shows the median number of 
observations (months) per fund. These median values range between 7 to 10 years of data. 
 
In addition to return data, we also obtain data on fund characteristics. We obtain Total 
Expense Ratio, Fund Age, Total Net Assets, and Turnover from the CRSP mutual fund 
database.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
In Table 2, we report summary statistics on several fund characteristics. The average Total 
Expense Ratio (TER) for all funds in the sample is 1.41%. In general, we observe that growth 
funds have higher TERs than value funds (this was also documented by Carhart (1997)), and 
that small cap funds charge higher TERs than large caps (a findings also observed by Brown 
et al., 2011). The average Age of the funds in our sample is 14.24 years, but again we note 
some variation across the different fund styles. First, we note that centre equity funds tend to 
be younger than value or growth funds. Second, we note that small cap funds tend to be 
younger than large cap funds.  
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The average size of the funds in our sample is $418.5 million, although there is considerable 
variation in the size of funds. In general, large cap funds tend to be larger than small cap 
funds. For value-growth, we note that growth funds are larger for the large cap funds, and 
that value funds are larger for the small cap funds. 
 
When we look at the Turnover of funds, we find an average Turnover ratio of 83.30%, which 
is again broadly in line with the ratios presented by Carhart (1997) and Brown et al. (2011). 
In line with these studies, we also find variation in Turnover ratio by style, where growth 
funds have higher Turnover ratios than value funds, and small cap funds have higher turnover 
ratios than large cap funds.  
 
To examine the style switching behavior of mutual fund managers, we compare the 
performance of each mutual fund with the performance of benchmark portfolios. These 
benchmark portfolios are obtained from Kenneth French’s data library.12  Instead of using the 
usual style factors, such as SMB and HML, we use the individual portfolios to construct these 
factors as our investment styles. In particular, we use the large-value (LV), large-growth 
(LG), small-value (SV), and small-growth (SG) portfolios.
13
 
 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
 
In Panel A of Table 3, we present descriptive statistics on the benchmark portfolios. The 
mean returns show quite some variation across the different styles, which is consistent with 
                                                          
12
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html 
13
For more details on the construction of these portfolios, see Kenneth French’s website.  
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the literature (e.g. Fama and French, 1993). The highest return is observed for the SV 
benchmark portfolio, with an average return of 1.424% per month, while the lowest return is 
observed for the LG portfolio (an average return of 0.816% per month). We observe that the 
value effect in returns is more prominent in the small-cap portfolios than in the large-cap 
portfolios. Standard deviations also differ considerably across the benchmark portfolios, 
where the highest standard deviation is observed for the SG portfolio (which has the second 
lowest average return) and is lowest for the LV portfolio. We also find some notable 
differences in the skewness of the different benchmark portfolios, where large cap firms have 
more negatively skewed returns than small caps, and value firms have more negatively 
skewed returns than growth firms.  
 
In Panel B, we report the correlations between the different benchmark portfolios. Since the 
benchmark portfolios are not long-short strategies which are market risk neutral such as SMB 
and HML, the correlations are quite high, but not so high that they will cause 
multicollinearity issues. The highest correlation is between SV and SG (0.8838) and lowest 
between the SG and LV portfolios (0.7117).  
 
 
4. Results 
 
In this section, we present the results of the model presented in Section 2. We start by 
presenting results for a specification with constant style exposures. Next, we report the results 
for two models where fund managers can 1) switch between all four styles (and e.g. could 
finance investments in growth stocks by selling small caps), and 2) switch between “twin 
styles”, i.e. between value-growth and large-small separately. We then examine whether the 
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switching behavior of fund managers is related to fund characteristics, and whether the style 
switching behavior affects the risk-adjusted performance of mutual funds. 
 
4.1 Unconditional Fund Exposures 
To examine whether funds indeed follow their stated investment style, we run a regression of 
the excess returns of a fund on the different investment styles, i.e.,   
 
,it
LG
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i
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i
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SV
iiit rrrrr        (4) 
 
where LGt
LV
t
SG
t
SV
t rrrr ,,, are the returns on the small-value, small-growth, large-value and 
large growth portfolios, respectively. We run this regression for each individual mutual fund. 
 
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE 
 
In Figure 1, we plot the unconditional loadings on the different investment styles. This plot 
clearly shows two patterns emerging. First, we observe that when moving from value to 
centre to growth, the loadings on LV and SV decrease, while the loadings on LG and SG 
increase. This suggests that the different investment styles indeed capture the value-growth 
classification of the funds. Second, when moving from large- to multi- to mid- to small-cap 
we observe that the loadings on LV and LG decrease, whereas loadings on SV and SG 
increase. This also suggests that the different investment styles capture the size classification 
of the funds. The findings in Figure 1 suggest that, unconditionally, funds indeed behave 
according to their stated investment style.  
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4.2 Style Switching Behavior of Fund Managers 
To examine the style switching behavior of mutual fund managers, we estimate the model 
described in Section 2. Empirically, we do this in two ways. We first estimate a model where 
fund managers can switch between all styles, and could, e.g., increase their exposure to the 
LG style, by lowering their exposure to e.g. the SV style. We refer to this as single switching. 
Second, we estimate a model where switching occurs according “twin-styles” (see Barberis 
and Shleifer, 2003), i.e. fund managers can switch within the value-growth dimension and in 
the small-large dimension. We refer to this as double switching.  
 
For the single switching model, we estimate the following equation, 
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where the weights are computed according to Equation (2), and profits are computed as 
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The model defined in Equations (5) and (6) assumes that fund managers switch between the 
four different strategies mentioned above.  
 
To examine the relevance and existence of twin styles we further estimate a double switching 
model, where we allow the switching to occur over size and/or book-to-market, i.e., 
 
- 20 - 
 
,)1)(1()1(
)1(
41|1|31|1|
21|1|11|1|
itti
BM
tit
SIZE
titti
BM
tit
SIZE
tit
ti
BM
tit
SIZE
titti
BM
tit
SIZE
titiit
LGwwLVww
SGwwSVwwr






   (7) 
 
where 
SIZE
titw 1|   is the conditional weight on a small cap style and 
BM
titw 1|   is the conditional weight 
on the value style. These weights are based on the profitability of each style measured as,  
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where LARGEkt 1-   is the profitability of the large cap investment style, 
SMALL
kt 1  is the profitability 
of the small cap investment style, VALUEkt 1  is the profitability of the value investment style and 
GROWTH
kt 1 is the profitability of the growth investment style. The weights are again computed 
according to Equation (2), but since Equation (7) has two different weights, we also estimate 
two different intensity of choice parameters (γSIZE and γBM). We estimate Equation (7) in three 
ways. First, we set γSIZE equal to 0 (this allows for switching only in the value-growth 
dimension). Second, we set γBM equal to 0 (this allows for switching only in the size 
dimension). Finally, we allow for switching in both direction simultaneously.  
 
In Equations (6) and (8), we select the optimal lag length in the profit function, by estimating 
the Equations for j = 1 to 12 and choose the optimal value, j*, by selecting the specification 
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with the highest log-likelihood. We estimate the switching models introduced in Section 2 for 
all funds in our sample. However, before presenting the cross-sectional results we first 
examine one particular fund in detail to better understand the mechanisms of the model. 
 
4.2.1 The Case of the Oppenheimer Main Street Opportunity Fund 
To provide some intuition on the underlying dynamics generated by our model, we present 
detailed results for one particular mutual fund. We select the Oppenheimer Main Street 
Opportunity Fund, CRSP fund number 23076. The fund is classified as multi-cap core-equity, 
and has data from September 2000 to the end of our sample in September 2010, yielding 120 
monthly observations. At the end of the sample period, the fund had $11.6mln assets under 
management and, as such, is a relatively small fund. From the group of funds that have 
significant switching parameters it is a random choice.  
 
 INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
 
Table 4 presents the results for the Oppenheimer fund for the static, the single switching, the 
value and size twin styles and the double “twin styles” switching models. The estimates for 
the static model reveal that the fund has significant exposures to the LG and SV portfolios, 
and, to a lesser extent, the SG portfolio. Both the multi-cap and the core-equity character are 
therefore well represented in this fund. To interpret the magnitude of the β’s, we need to 
divide the estimated values by 4, because in the static model, γ = 0, giving each weight a 
value of 0.25. Hence, a 1% return in the LG portfolio results in, on average, 1.574/4 = 
0.3935% return to the fund.  
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The second column of Table 4 presents the estimation results for the single switching model 
(Equations (5) and (6)). The results for the β’s remain roughly the same, although βSG 
becomes insignificant in this model. Most importantly, the intensity of choice parameter, γ, is 
positive and significant. A Likelihood Ratio test (LR
STATIC
) confirms that the fit of the 
switching model is significantly better than the static model.
14
 The fact that γ is positive 
suggests that the manager of the Oppenheimer Main Street Fund follows a positive feedback 
(momentum) strategy. In the best fitting model, the manager ranks the performance of the 
four benchmark portfolios over the past 12 months, j* = 12, and allocates capital in 
accordance with this ranking.  
 
In the next three columns of Table 3, we present the results for the double switching models 
(Equations (7) and (8)). The estimated unconditional exposures are relatively unchanged 
compared with the static model. For the model where we only allow for switching in the 
value-growth dimension, we find a positive and significant coefficient, indicating that the 
fund manager acts as a positive feedback trader. The significance is confirmed by the 
Likelihood ratio test versus the static model, which produces a LR statistic of 5.52. For the 
switching in the size dimension, we find an insignificant coefficient and also the LR statistic 
of 1.78 is insignificant. This suggests that there is no switching behavior of this fund in the 
size dimension. In the last column, we include the double twin style model, where switching 
can occur in both directions. In this model, we again observe that γBM is significant and γSIZE 
is not. The double twin style model performs significantly better than the static model with a 
LR statistic of 8.10. Finally, we report the LR statistics of the double twin style model versus 
                                                          
14
Note that because of the nonlinearity in the model a t-test may not always indicate whether there is significant 
evidence for switching. However, a significant increase in the likelihood provides this evidence.   
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the value and size twin style. The tests show that the double twin style model does not 
improve significantly on the value twin style model, but does improve significantly on the 
size twin style model. This leads us to conclude that this fund only display switching 
behavior in the value-growth dimension and follows a positive feedback trading rule to do 
this.  
 
 INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE  
 
In Figure 2, we plot the relation between the performance difference for book-to-market and 
size (πVALUE- πGROWTH and πLARGE- πSMALL) versus the weight put on value and large cap stocks 
(w
VALUE
 and w
LARGE
) for the double switching model. For both relations, we observe an 
upward sloping curve. This is because of the positive values for γBM and γSIZE, leading to a 
positive relation between past performance and current exposure. The line for the size 
switching is steeper than for the book-to-market switching, because γSIZE > γBM. From Figure 
2, we can deduce that if the value benchmark under- or outperform the growth benchmark by 
40% in the past year, the manager changes the weight on value from about 0.4 to 0.6. In the 
size dimension a similar under- or outperformance between large and small caps leads to a 
change in the weight on large cap from about 0.25 to 0.75. An interesting observation from 
Figure 2 is that the value weights are concentrated in the upper right corner, while the size 
weights are concentrated in the lower left corner. This implies that over this period value, on 
average, outperformed growth, whereas small caps outperformed large caps.  
 
INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE 
 
- 24 - 
 
Figure 3 shows the profit differences and the weights in a time series plot, where the upper 
part of the graph shows the weights, w
VALUE
 and w
LARGE
, and the lower part shows the 
performance difference (πVALUE- πGROWTH and πLARGE- πSMALL). Clearly, there is substantial 
time variation in the book-to-market and size weights, ranging roughly from 0.2 to 0.8. 
During the years 2001 and 2002, value firms outperformed growth firms, causing the weight 
on value firms to be high. For the remaining years, the value premium stays slightly positive, 
causing the book-to-market weight to be slightly above 0.5, on average. The size premium is 
closer to zero throughout the sample period. An interesting exception is the peak in 2001, 
causing the fund manager to increase the weight on large stocks. In addition, from late 2003 
to mid 2004 large cap stocks clearly underperform small cap stocks, resulting in a decrease of 
the weight on large cap stocks to its low of approximately 0.2.  
 
 INSERT FIGURE 4 HERE  
 
Figure 4 presents a time series plot of the conditional exposures to the four benchmark 
portfolios, given by the time varying weights wit multiplied by the unconditional exposures 
βi
k
. The top-left plot shows the conditional beta on the large value portfolio. As observed 
from Table 3, the unconditional exposure to the LV portfolio was small, and although there is 
quite some variation in the conditional beta, in absolute terms the exposure remains low. The 
top-right plot shows the conditional beta for the LG portfolio. Unconditionally, the loading on 
this portfolio was largest, and we observe that this portfolio also has the largest absolute 
variation. Over time the exposure to LG ranges from a low of about 0.25 in late 2001- early 
2002 and again in early 2004 to a high of 0.9 around the start of 2008. This suggests that 
there are large shifts in the exposure of this fund to the LG portfolio. The bottom-left plot 
shows the conditional beta of the SV portfolio. Again, we note considerable variation in the 
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conditional exposure, where the exposure peaks from the middle of 2001 to the middle of 
2002 and troughs at the start of 2008. Finally, the bottom-right plot shows the conditional 
exposure for the SG portfolio. The conditional exposure on the SG portfolio bottoms at the 
start of 2001 and peaks in the period 2003-2004. Again, this plot show considerable time 
variation in the conditional exposure to the SG portfolio. 
 
4.2.2 Do Mutual Funds Switch? 
We estimate the single and twin style switching models for all mutual funds in our sample 
and present summary statistics in Table 5. We first report the percentage of funds for which 
the likelihood of the single γ model increases significantly at the 5% level compared with the 
static model (Panel A). We report the percentage of funds with positive and significant γ and 
negative and significant γ. Overall, we find considerable improvements in the model fit when 
allowing for switching behavior of fund managers. We find that there is significant switching 
for about 53% (30% + 23%) of the funds in our sample. Most significance in switching is 
reported for the Mid Cap Value Equity funds (68%), whereas the least significance is found 
for the Large Cap Growth Equity funds (44%).  
 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
 
We split out the percentage of significant switching into positive significant switching (i.e. 
where we observe significant positive feedback or momentum trading) and negative 
switching (where we observe significant negative feedback or contrarian trading). The results 
reveal several interesting patterns. We observe that, for all size groups, there is considerably 
more positive feedback trading as we go from value to growth funds. When we look at the 
results for negative feedback trading, we observe the opposite pattern, i.e. for value funds we 
- 26 - 
 
find most evidence for negative feedback trading, which then decreases for centre and 
decreases more for growth funds. This clearly suggests that the style switching behavior is 
style dependent. This finding is interesting in the light of results of Blackburn et al. (2011). 
Blackburn et al. (2011) find that individual investors follow positive feedback strategies 
when buying growth funds, but negative feedback strategies when buying value funds, 
suggesting that individual investors follow different strategies for different styles. Our results 
suggest that this is not only the case for individual investors, but also for fund managers.  
 
In Panel B of Table 5, we present the results for the double twin-style switching model, 
where we allow for two different switching parameters. This Panel presents the percentage of 
funds for which the double switching model yields a significantly higher likelihood than the 
static model. In total, we find significant switching for about 76% of the funds in the sample. 
This number is consistent with Grinblatt et al. (1995), who find that 77% of funds buy stocks 
that were past winners. When looking at the difference between positive feedback trading and 
negative feedback trading, we again observe several patterns. For the switching in the size 
dimension, we observe that, except for large-cap funds, there is more positive feedback 
trading for growth funds than for value funds, and more negative feedback trading for value 
funds than for growth funds. For the switching in the value dimension we find that there is 
more positive feedback trading for growth funds across all size styles and more negative 
feedback trading in value funds than growth funds.  
 
In Panel B3 of Table 5, we report results on single versus double twin style switching. The 
first row in this panel reports the percentage of funds for which the value twin style switching 
model is the best. Overall, we observe that most of the funds that switch do so in both the 
value-growth dimension and the size dimension instead of just in one single direction. 
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Growth funds engage more often in double switching than do value funds. Interestingly, in 
the majority of cases funds are not consistent in their choice of applying positive or negative 
feedback trading with respect to BM and size switching. This result is consistent with 
Blackburn et al. (2011), who conclude that positive or negative feedback trading is not a 
character trait of investors, but determined by the style they are investing in. 
 
4.3 Style Switching and Fund Characteristics 
Section 4.2 reports evidence of style switching behavior of mutual fund managers. In this 
section, we examine whether the style switching behavior is related to fund characteristics, 
specifically, the total expense ratio, age, size and turnover of the fund. We obtain these fund 
characteristics from CRSP. We run a cross-sectional regression of the absolute style 
switching parameters on several fund characteristics, i.e.  
 
iiiiiii StyleDummyLagTERTurnoverTNALogAgeLog   54321 )()( ,  (9) 
 
where Log(Agei) is the log of the median age of the fund, Log(TNAi) is the log of the 
beginning of period size of the fund,
15
 Turnoveri is the median share turnover of the fund, 
TERi is the total expense ratio of the fund, Lagi is the number of lags j
*
 that is used to 
estimate γ, and StyleDummyi are dummy variables to control for the investment style of fund 
i.   
                                                          
15
Note that we include beginning of period Total Net Assets of the funds instead of average fund size to avoid 
endogeneity issues.   
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In Table 6, we present the results for Equation (9) using the different γ’s, i.e. |γSINGLE|, |γBM| 
and |γSIZE|, and report White corrected t-statistics in parentheses.16 The first column of Table 6 
shows the results for |γSINGLE|. We find a positive and significant relationship with TER, 
suggesting that funds that switch more charge higher expense ratios. We further find a 
negative and significant relationship with age, suggesting that older funds tend to switch less 
aggressively. There is also a negative and significant relationship with Lag, suggesting that 
more aggressive switching occurs at shorter look-back periods.  
 
In the next two columns of Table 6, we separate |γSINGLE| into positive and negative values. 
We do this to assess whether positive or negative feedback trading is affected by specific 
fund characteristics. We first note that when we split |γSINGLE| into positive and negative, TER 
is no longer significant for the positive feedback traders, but remains significant for negative 
feedback traders. The negative significance of age remains for both positive and negative 
feedback trading. We further observe a positive and significant relationship between positive 
feedback trading and turnover, but an insignificant relationship between negative feedback 
trading and turnover. This suggests that funds that engage in positive feedback trading trade 
more actively than negative feedback traders. Finally, we find that the significant relationship 
between switching behavior and lag observed in the first column is driven by the negative 
feedback trading funds. Negative feedback traders switch more aggressively based on shorter 
look-back periods.  
 
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
 
                                                          
16
We report the results, where we have used the absolute value for gamma for all funds in the sample. We have 
also run this regression only for funds with significant switching. However, the results are almost identical to 
those reported in this paper.   
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In the next set of columns, we report the results for |γBM|. The first column in this block shows 
that switching in the value-growth dimension is positively related to TER. We further observe 
significantly negative relationships with Age and Lag. When splitting the switching 
parameter into positive and negative feedback trading, we observe that TER is only related to 
positive feedback trading. The negative relationships of |γBM| with age and lag are observed in 
both positive and negative feedback trading. 
 
The last block of columns of Table 6 reports the regression results for |γSIZE|. In the first 
column, we observe that |γSIZE| has a negative and significant relationship with Age, i.e. older 
funds switch less aggressively in the size dimension. We further find a significant positive 
relationship with Turnover, suggesting that funds that switch more aggressively in the size 
dimension have a higher turnover of stocks in their portfolio. When splitting |γSIZE| into 
positive and negative feedback trading, we find that the relationship between |γSIZE| and Age 
is driven by the negative feedback trading funds, i.e. older funds engage in less negative 
feedback trading (there is no significant relationship between positive feedback trading and 
age). The relationship between turnover and |γSIZE| is driven by the positive feedback trading 
funds. We further find a significantly negative relationship between lag and positive feedback 
trading in the size dimension, suggesting that fund managers that follow a momentum 
strategy in the size dimension trade more aggressively at shorter look-back periods. 
 
5.4 Outperformance and Style Switching 
The next issue we address is whether the style switching behavior of fund managers is related 
to the outperformance of the fund. To address this question, we compute Jensen’s α for each 
mutual fund using the four factor Carhart (1997) model, and use this α in the following cross-
sectional regression,  
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iiiiiiiiii StyleDummylsFundControLagLagc  

2211 ,   (10) 
 
where αi is the constant of the four factor Carhart (1997) model; 

i  and 

i  are the style 
switching parameters for positive feedback trading and negative feedback trading, 
respectively; Lag is the number of lags that is used to estimate γ; FundControlsi account for 
different fund characteristics that may lead to outperformance; and StyleDummyi are dummy 
variables to control for the investment style of fund i. We include an interaction term between 
γ and Lag as different trading strategies may work better at different look-back periods, i.e. 
positive feedback (momentum) trading may work better if it is based on switching rules that 
look back for only a few months (in which case lag is low), whereas negative feedback 
(contrarian) trading, may work better if the look back period is longer (in which case lag is 
high).  
 
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
 
In Panel A of Table 7, we report the results for Equation (10). The first column of Panel A 
shows the results for the single switching parameter. We find a positive and significant 
relationship between γ+ and α, suggesting that more aggressive positive feedback trading 
leads to greater risk-adjusted performance. The interaction term of γ+ with lag has a 
significantly negative sign, which suggests that as the look-back horizon gets longer, the 
profitability of positive feedback trading decreases. This is in line with e.g. Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993) and Rouwenhorst (1998) (amongst many others) who find that momentum 
strategies work better when based on short look back horizons. Next, we consider the results 
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for γ-. We find a positive significant impact of γ- on the α of the fund. This suggest that the 
lower (more negative) γ- is (i.e. the more aggressively the fund manager acts as a negative 
feedback trader), the lower the risk-adjusted performance of the fund is. The interaction term 
of γ- with lags yields a negative coefficient, suggesting that the coefficient on γ- decreases as 
the look-back horizon increase. The loading on γ- becomes negative from 4 lags and onwards. 
This implies that when fund managers follow a contrarian strategy, their strategy starts to 
have a positive impact on risk-adjusted performance if they base their switching behavior on 
longer look-back horizons. For the fund-level control variables, we find a negative 
relationship between α and Age, Fund Size, Turnover and a negative relationship between α 
and TER. All these results are consistent with the literature (see e.g. Carhart, 1997).  
 
In the second column of Table 7, we show the results for the switching in the value-growth 
dimension. We find that the impact of positive feedback trading in this dimension, in general, 
is positive. However, there is no impact of lags or negative feedback trading. 
 
In the third column, we report the results for the regression of risk-adjusted performance on 
the switching in the size dimension. This column shows the opposite result of the switching 
in the value dimension.  In this regression, we find a negative relationship between positive 
feedback trading and risk-adjusted performance. As for the fund controls, there an no notable 
difference with the results presented in the first column. 
 
In Panel B of Table 7, we report the results of a regression similar to Equation (10), but now 
split the positive and negative switching parameters into quartiles based on their look-back 
horizon. We define 1 , 

2 , 

3 , 

4 , and 

1 , 

2 , 

3 , 

4  as the positive and negative 
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switching parameters for lags less than 3 months, between 4 and 6 months, between 7 and 9, 
and between 10 and 12 months, respectively. The first column, where we assess the 
relationship between the single switching parameter and the risk-adjusted performance of a 
fund, shows that there is no risk-adjusted performance due to trading as a positive feedback 
trader in the short-run, but that there are mainly negative effects for acting like a positive 
feedback trader in the long-run. The impact of negative feedback trading has the opposite 
pattern. There is a loss due to negative feedback trading in the short-run, but there are no 
gains in the long-run. These results broadly confirm findings of Brown et al. (2011), who 
show that fund with high style volatility (more style switching) perform worse than funds 
with low style volatility. 
 
In columns 2 and 3, we report the results for the switching in the B/M and size dimensions, 
respectively. For the style switching in the B/M dimension, we find insignificant results for 
the positive feedback trading rules, while we find a significantly negative relationship 
between risk-adjusted performance and the negative feedback trading rules. For the size 
dimension, we find that positive feedback trading mostly leads to lower risk-adjusted 
performance (significantly so in the windows of 4 to 9 months). For the contrarian strategy in 
this dimension we find mixed results, where there is some evidence of contrarian trading 
leading to higher risk-adjusted performance in the 4 to 6 month window and leading to lower 
risk-adjusted performance in the 7 to 9 month window.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper seeks empirical evidence for the style switching model proposed in Barberis and 
Shleifer (2003). Using a sample of US equity funds, we find strong evidence for feedback 
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trading by fund managers. Our results reveal that around 53% of the funds in our sample 
display some form of feedback trading. An interesting observation is that slightly more than 
half of these are negative feedback strategies: increasing (decreasing) the exposure to recent 
losers (winners). Switching seems to occur predominantly between the value and growth 
styles, and less so between the small and large cap styles. A higher propensity to switch is 
found for funds with a higher total expense ratio, younger funds, value funds, and mid-cap 
funds. Finally, we find that when fund managers apply feedback trading rules ‘correctly’, i.e. 
momentum trading in the short run and contrarian trading in the long run, there are no extra 
gains or losses from this strategy. However, if fund managers apply these rules ‘incorrectly’, 
i.e. long-term momentum and short-term contrarian trading, this actually leads to 
underperformance.  
 
- 34 - 
 
References 
Annaert, J. and van Campenhout, G., 2007. Time variation in mutual fund style exposures. 
Review of Finance 11, 633-661.  
 
Bange, M.M., 2000. Do the portfolios of small investors reflect positive feedback trading? 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 35, 239–255. 
 
Barberis, N., Shleifer, A., 2003. Style investing. Journal of Financial Economics 68, 161-
199.  
 
Blackburn, D., Goetzman, W. and Ukhov, A., 2011. Trading behavior of style and multi-style 
Investors. Working Paper. 
 
Brock, W. A. and Hommes, C. H., 1997. A rational route to randomness.  Econometrica 65, 
1059-1095. 
 
Brock, W. A. and Hommes, C. H., 1998. Heterogeneous beliefs and routes to chaos in a 
simple asset pricing model. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 22, 1235-1274. 
 
Brown, K. Harlow, W., and Starks, L., 1996. Of tournaments and temptations: an analysis of 
managerial incentives in the mutual fund industry. Journal of Finance 51, 85-110. 
 
Brown, K., Harlow, W., and Zhang, H., 2011. Investment style volatility and mutual fund 
performance. Working paper. 
 
Budiono, D. and Martens, M, 2010. Mutual fund style timing skills and alpha. Working 
paper. 
 
Carhart, M.M., 1997. On persistence in mutual fund performance. Journal of Finance 52, 57-
82.  
 
Chan, L. K. Chen, H.-L. and Lakonishok, J., 2002. On mutual fund investment styles. Review 
of Financial Studies 15, 1407-1437. 
- 35 - 
 
 
 
Choe, H., Kho, B.C. and R. Stulz, 1999. Do foreign investors destabilize stock markets? 
Journal of Financial Economics 54, 227–264. 
 
Fama, E.F. and K.R. French, 1993. Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds. 
Journal of Financial Economics 33, 3-56. 
 
Froot, K., O’Connell, P. and M. Seasholes, 2001. The portfolio flows of international 
investors. Journal of Financial Economics 59, 149–193. 
 
Froot, K. and Teo, M., 2008. Style investing and institutional investors. Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative Analysis 43, 883-906. 
 
Goetzman, W. and Massa, M., 2002. Daily momentum and contrarian behaviour of index 
fund investors. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 37, 375-389. 
 
Grinblatt, M., Titman, S., and Wermers, R. (1995). Momentum Investment Strategies, Portfolio 
Performance, and Herding: A Study of Mutual Fund Behavior, American Economic Review 85, 1088-
1105.  
 
Jegadeesh, N. and S. Titman, 1993. Returns to buying winners and selling losers: 
Implications for stock market efficiency. Journal of Finance 48, 65-91.  
 
Keim, D.B. and A. Madhavan, 1995. Anatomy of the trading process: Empirical evidence on 
the behavior of institutional investors. Journal of Financial Economics 37, 371–398. 
 
Manski, C. F. and McFadden, D., 1981. Structural analysis of discrete data with econometric 
applications. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
 
Rouwenhorst,  K.G., 1998. International momentum strategies. Journal of Finance 53, 267-
284. 
 
- 36 - 
 
Sirri, E. and Tufano, P., 1998. Costly search and mutual fund flows. Journal of Finance 53, 
1589-1662. 
 
Swinkels, L., and Tjong-a-Tjoe, L., 2007. Can mutual funds time investment styles? Journal 
of Asset Management 8, 123-132. 
 
Teo, M. and Woo, S.-J., 2004. Style effects in the cross-section of stock returns. Journal of 
Financial Economics 74, 367-398. 
 
Wermers, R. (2012). Matter of Style: The Causes and Consequences of Style Drift in 
Institutional Portfolios, Working Paper, University of Maryland. 
- 37 - 
 
Table 1. Mutual Fund Descriptive Statistics 
     MEDIANS   
 # FUNDS  RETURN STDEV MIN MAX # OBS 
LCVE 128  0.686% 4.860% -18.108% 9.716% 125 
LCCE 208  0.667% 4.931% -18.049% 9.471% 104.5 
LCGE 128  0.530% 5.535% -19.438% 11.213% 114 
MLVE 239  0.663% 4.973% -19.787% 10.498% 122 
MLCE 326  0.731% 5.034% -18.970% 9.999% 89.5 
MLGE 184  0.756% 6.253% -22.262% 13.280% 124 
MCVE 96  0.916% 5.567% -23.026% 13.138% 112.5 
MCCE 120  0.976% 6.041% -24.471% 13.473% 98 
MCGE 145  0.848% 7.225% -25.184% 17.658% 93 
SCVE 163  0.943% 6.006% -23.089% 13.940% 123 
SCCE 168  1.024% 6.462% -23.409% 14.662% 92 
SCGE 139  0.944% 7.536% -26.892% 20.709% 110 
Note: This Table presents descriptive statistics for the mutual funds in the sample. LC, ML, MC, and SC 
represents large cap, multi cap, mid cap, and small cap, respectively. VE, CE, and GE represents value equity, 
core equity, and growth equity, respectively. #FUNDS is the total number of funds in each particular style 
classification. All other variables are presented as median values over all funds. RETURN, STDEV, MIN, and 
MAX are presented as monthly percentages. 
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Table 2. Fund Characteristics 
 ALL LCVE LCCE LCGE MLVE MLCE MLGE MCVE MCCE MCGE SCVE SCCE SCGE 
 Total Expense Ratio 
Mean 1.41% 1.26% 1.32% 1.43% 1.35% 1.25% 1.49% 1.39% 1.39% 1.65% 1.47% 1.45% 1.62% 
Std Dev 0.53% 0.51% 0.51% 0.54% 0.49% 0.55% 0.54% 0.42% 0.57% 0.58% 0.43% 0.50% 0.41% 
Perc. 5% 0.51% 0.47% 0.56% 0.68% 0.53% 0.20% 0.75% 0.79% 0.40% 0.91% 0.96% 0.57% 1.04% 
Perc. 50% 1.35% 1.17% 1.25% 1.30% 1.26% 1.26% 1.45% 1.29% 1.39% 1.55% 1.40% 1.41% 1.50% 
Perc. 95% 2.27% 2.08% 2.17% 2.28% 2.17% 2.14% 2.34% 2.15% 2.25% 2.50% 2.37% 2.27% 2.50% 
 Fund Age (in years) 
Mean 14.24 16.66 14.03 15.59 15.65 13.14 15.62 15.60 13.35 13.30 14.44 11.31 13.31 
Std Dev 10.52 14.56 12.56 11.74 12.19 10.04 12.07 9.26 8.89 9.85 6.73 5.41 6.80 
Perc. 5% 5.00 4.91 4.47 4.24 5.22 4.78 4.26 5.42 5.21 5.16 5.29 5.42 5.34 
Perc. 50% 11.84 12.76 10.59 12.41 12.75 10.76 13.17 13.62 10.91 10.93 13.63 10.42 12.80 
Perc. 95% 32.93 45.95 34.81 41.68 34.39 25.59 43.61 35.42 27.97 33.71 26.04 18.59 25.76 
 Total Net Assets (in Millions) 
Mean 418.5 530.2 770.5 858.2 334.4 411.9 444.1 399.3 440.5 168.1 333.0 195.8 170.9 
Std Dev 1754.5 1348.2 4394.0 2584.5 766.5 1285.3 1302.1 656.4 1084.6 286.9 941.6 358.3 372.4 
Perc. 5% 15.1 16.1 14.2 14.2 15.0 13.8 15.3 18.8 17.2 14.3 16.4 15.9 15.0 
Perc. 50% 72.3 88.4 67.8 78.8 83.3 65.4 93.2 132.1 68.5 49.3 64.9 69.8 67.9 
Perc. 95% 1598.5 2911.7 2056.7 6338.3 1573.7 2326.7 2243.4 1814.3 2937.0 755.3 1500.3 640.1 663.1 
 Turnover (percentage of TNA) 
Mean 83.30% 64.07% 60.40% 80.97% 57.75% 69.66% 123.65% 75.60% 84.37% 126.17% 65.93% 95.35% 120.27% 
Std Dev 93.87% 81.84% 43.81% 87.17% 38.76% 77.42% 162.61% 89.03% 82.29% 93.00% 76.41% 133.09% 63.67% 
Perc. 5% 11.50% 7.00% 4.00% 16.00% 14.00% 4.50% 21.00% 11.00% 17.00% 28.00% 17.00% 19.00% 46.50% 
Perc. 50% 64.00% 51.00% 52.50% 68.48% 47.00% 51.00% 90.50% 62.00% 65.00% 104.00% 53.00% 68.00% 100.25% 
Perc. 95% 204.00% 192.00% 139.50% 166.00% 138.00% 204.00% 267.00% 150.00% 230.50% 280.00% 133.50% 195.50% 245.00% 
Note: This Table presents summary statistics on fund characteristics. We present the values for the mean, standard deviation, and the 5%, 50%, and 95% percentiles. We 
report statistics for the Total Expense Ratio, Fund Age, Total Net Assets, and Turnover for all funds and per fund category. 
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for the Benchmark Portfolios 
 LV LG SV SG 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean 1.073% 0.816% 1.424% 0.827% 
 Median 1.325% 0.920% 1.760% 1.055% 
 Maximum 21.090% 21.260% 30.270% 28.880% 
 Minimum -22.640% -23.230% -27.720% -32.340% 
 Std. Dev. 4.720% 4.753% 5.660% 6.969% 
 Skewness -0.413 -0.292 -0.377% -0.303% 
 Kurtosis 5.604 4.676 6.335 4.671 
Panel B: Correlations 
LV 1.0000    
LG 0.7825 1.0000   
SV 0.8512 0.7433 1.0000  
SG 0.7117 0.8259 0.8838 1.0000 
Note: This Table presents descriptive statistics for the four benchmark portfolios. SV, SG, LV’, and LG, 
represents small value, small growth, big value, and big growth, respectively. 
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Table 4. Estimation results for the Oppenheimer Main Street Opportunity Fund 
      
 Static Model Single γ Value twin style  Size twin style  Double twin styles 
βLV 0.309 0.000 -0.038 0.554 0.129 
 (0.913) (0.002) (-0.142) (1.601) (0.441) 
βLG 1.574*** 2.253*** 2.274*** 1.756*** 2.510*** 
 (3.844) (3.631) (4.135) (4.221) (4.961) 
βSV 1.117*** 0.975*** 1.112*** 0.838** 0.824*** 
 (3.238) (3.429) (4.310) (2.138) (2.896) 
βSG 0.598* 0.605 0.568 0.564* 0.573* 
 (1.886) (1.395) (1.560) (1.720) (1.707) 
γ  0.021***    
  (2.779)    
γBM   0.013***  0.011** 
   (2.600)  (2.557) 
γSIZE    0.024 0.025 
    (1.201) (0.020) 
α -0.130 -0.129 -0.194 -0.098 -0.143 
 (-0.197) (-0.450) (-0.724) (-0.389) (-0.555) 
Lag  12 12 12 12, 12 
LOGL -254.43 -251.07 -251.67 -253.54 -250.38 
LR
STATIC 
 6.720*** 5.520** 1.780 8.100*** 
LR
BM 
    -2.580 
LR
SIZE
     -6.320** 
Note: This Table presents the estimation results of the static model (first column); the single switching model 
(second column); the twin style value switching model (third columns); the twin style size switching model 
(fourth columns); and the double twin style model (third column) for the Oppenheimer Main Street Opportunity 
Fund. White corrected t-statistics are reported in parentheses. LR is the outcome of a Likelihood Ratio test 
versus the static model. LR
BM
 is the outcome of a Likelihood Ratio test of the twin style value model versus the 
double twin style model, and LR
SIZE
 is the outcome of a Likelihood Ratio test of the twin style size model versus 
the double twin style model. We indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, by *, **, and ***, 
respectively.   
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Table 5. Percentage of Switching Funds 
Notes: This Table presents the percentage of funds for which we find significant switching. Specifically, we give the percentage of funds for which the likelihood ratio test 
indicates that switching adds significantly to the explanatory power of the model. Panel A represents results of the single switching model versus the static model; Panel B 
presents the results of the double switching model versus the static model; and Panel C presents the results of the single versus double switching model.
 ALL  LCVE LCCE LCGE  MCVE MCCE MCGE  MLVE MLCE MLGE  SCVE SCCE SCGE 
 Panel A: Single γ Model 
Total 52.56%  50.45% 47.90% 44.33%  68.67% 50.98% 57.69%  52.15% 52.79% 49.38%  48.46% 50.75% 60.83% 
Positive γ 22.61%  12.84% 13.77% 20.62%  18.07% 21.57% 40.77%  11.96% 27.51% 41.36%  2.31% 16.42% 43.33% 
Negative γ 29.95%  37.61% 34.13% 23.71%  50.60% 29.41% 16.92%  40.19% 25.28% 8.02%  46.15% 34.33% 17.50% 
  
 Panel B1: Twin Styles – Only BM Switching 
Total 20.69%  20.93% 24.82% 16.67%  24.10% 21.57% 14.62%  28.87% 26.02% 10.69%  11.29% 25.98% 15.13% 
Positive γ 5.96%  0.00% 4.26% 5.95%  4.82% 6.86% 8.46%  5.15% 5.69% 5.03%  1.61% 11.02% 11.76% 
Negative γ 14.73%  20.93% 20.57% 10.71%  19.28% 14.71% 6.15%  23.71% 20.33% 5.66%  9.68% 14.96% 3.36% 
  
 Panel B2: Twin Styles – Only Size Switching 
Total 17.62%  25.58% 12.06% 8.33%  24.10% 22.55% 13.85%  10.82% 14.23% 19.50%  29.84% 16.54% 24.37% 
Positive γ 9.03%  18.60% 6.38% 2.38%  10.84% 11.76% 10.77%  6.19% 7.72% 13.84%  0.81% 7.09% 15.97% 
Negative γ 8.59%  6.98% 5.67% 5.95%  13.25% 10.78% 3.08%  4.64% 6.50% 5.66%  29.03% 9.45% 8.40% 
  
 Panel B3: Twin Styles – Double Switching 
Total 38.9%  29.1% 32.6% 38.1%  36.1% 34.3% 54.6%  40.2% 37.0% 43.4%  42.7% 29.1% 44.5% 
Pos Size – Pos BM 8.84%  5.81% 5.67% 3.57%  6.02% 4.90% 18.46%  10.82% 7.72% 16.35%  4.03% 3.15% 13.45% 
Pos Size – Neg BM 11.10%  12.79% 7.09% 10.71%  7.23% 15.69% 19.23%  10.31% 9.76% 10.06%  6.45% 11.81% 14.29% 
Neg Size – Pos BM 9.84%  4.65% 6.38% 11.90%  10.84% 4.90% 13.08%  7.22% 11.38% 8.81%  18.55% 7.09% 12.61% 
Neg Size – Neg BM 9.09%  5.81% 13.48% 11.90%  12.05% 8.82% 3.85%  11.86% 8.13% 8.18%  13.71% 7.09% 4.20% 
  
 Panel B4: Twin Styles – TOTAL 
Total 77.2%  75.6% 69.5% 63.1%  84.3% 78.4% 83.1%  79.9% 77.3% 73.6%  83.8% 71.6% 84.0% 
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Table 6. Relation between Style Switching and Fund Characteristics 
 Single Switching  Double Switching 
 |γSINGLE|  |γBM|  |γSIZE| 
 All Pos Neg  All Pos Neg  All Pos Neg 
TER 0.344** 0.199 0.372**  0.469** 0.785** 0.190  -0.379 -0.422 -0.390 
 (2.078) (0.674) (2.138)  (2.189) (2.000) (0.827)  (-0.882) (-0.606) (-0.823) 
LOG(AGE) -0.006*** -0.006** -0.008***  -0.012*** -0.015*** -0.010***  -0.014*** -0.003 -0.026*** 
 (-4.939) (-2.268) (-4.867)  (-6.480) (-5.179) (-4.487)  (-4.498) (-0.756) (-6.780) 
LOG(TNA) 0.000 -0.002 0.002**  0.000 -0.002 0.001  -0.001 -0.002 0.002 
 (0.365) (-1.541) (2.098)  (0.289) (-1.135) (1.014)  (-1.490) (-0.896) (1.062) 
TURNOVER 0.001 0.004* -0.001  0.001 0.002 -0.001  0.006*** 0.008*** 0.003 
 (1.033) (1.829) (-1.023)  (0.640) (0.889) (-0.568)  (2.945) (4.247) (0.628) 
LAG -0.001*** -0.001 -0.001***  -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003***  -0.001 -0.001** -0.001 
 (-2.843) (-0.798) (-5.721)  (-9.143) (-5.731) (-5.792)  (-1.490) (-2.610) (-1.035) 
Style dummies YES YES YES  YES YES YES  YES YES YES 
            
Adj. R2 0.070 0.066 0.135  0.136 0.162 0.108  0.065 0.088 0.085 
#OBS 1878 838 1040  1807 796 1011  1807 901 906 
Notes: This Table reports the regression results for Equation (9). |γSINGLE| is the absolute value of the style 
switching coefficient in the single switching model (Equations (5) and (6)); |γSIZE| and |γBM| are the absolute 
values of the style switching coefficients in the double switching model (Equations (7) and (8)); Log(Agei) is the 
log of the age of the fund; Log(TNAi) is the log of the beginning of period size of the fund; Turnoveri is the 
median share turnover of the fund; and TERi is the total expense ratio of the fund. In each regression, we include 
dummy variables to control for the stated fund style (not reported). We report White corrected t-statistics in 
parentheses. We indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, by *, **, and ***, respectively.    
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Table 7. Risk-Adjusted Performance and Style Switching 
 γSINGLE γBM γSIZE 
Panel A: Interaction between Style Switching and Lags 
γ+ 
0.712** 
(2.367) 
0.492*** 
(2.721) 
0.196 
(0.763) 
γ+*Lag 
-0.072** 
(-2.145) 
-0.034 
(-0.938) 
-0.016 
(-0.517) 
γ- 
0.303 
(1.376) 
0.068 
(0.430) 
-0.052 
(-0.261) 
γ-*Lag 
-0.086*** 
(-3.389) 
-0.007 
(-0.223) 
-0.012 
(-0.368) 
    
Log(Age) 
-0.051*** 
(-3.832) 
-0.057*** 
(-4.101) 
-0.056*** 
(-4.199) 
Log(TNA) 
-0.019** 
(2.547) 
-0.017** 
(-2.290) 
-0.018** 
(-2.471) 
Turnover 
-0.036*** 
(-3.476) 
-0.039*** 
(-3.520) 
-0.037*** 
(-3.431) 
TER 
-7.557*** 
(-4.810) 
-7.540*** 
(-4.934) 
-7.582*** 
(-5.007) 
Style dummies YES YES YES 
R2(adj) 0.091 0.124 0.078 
Panel B: Piecewise Linear Relation between Style Switching and Lags 

1  
0.206 
(1.317) 
-0.040 
(-0.247) 
-0.240 
(-1.112) 

2  
0.109 
(0.266) 
0.112 
(0.277) 
-0.065** 
(-2.147) 

3  
-0.605** 
(-2.478) 
-0.241 
(-1.547) 
-0.046*** 
(-2.786) 

4  
-0.067*** 
(-5.829) 
-0.064 
(-1.455) 
-0.007 
(-0.145) 
    

1  
0.581** 
(2.525) 
0.515*** 
(4.088) 
-0.005 
(-0.034) 

2  
-0.100 
(-0.801) 
0.165* 
(1.803) 
-0.111** 
(-2.207) 

3  
0.134** 
(2.108) 
0.235** 
(2.332) 
0.095** 
(2.232) 

4  
-0.083 
(-1.232) 
0.034 
(0.429) 
-0.006 
(-0.352) 
    
Log(Age) 
-0.050*** 
(-3.679) 
-0.061*** 
(-4.397) 
-0.052*** 
(-3.905) 
Log(TNA) 
-0.019** 
(2.509) 
-0.017** 
(2.395) 
-0.019*** 
(-2.605) 
Turnover 
-0.036*** 
(-3.665) 
-0.039*** 
(-3.541) 
-0.038*** 
(-3.482) 
TER 
-7.057*** 
(-4.431) 
-7.343*** 
(-4.807) 
-7.269*** 
(-0.953) 
Style dummies YES YES YES 
R2(adj) 0.095 0.091 0.083 
Notes: This Table displays the estimation results of Equation (10). γSINGLE is the style switching coefficient in the 
single switching model (Equations (5) and (6)); γSIZE and γBM are the style switching coefficients in the double 
switching model (Equations (7) and (8)). 

i  and 

i  are the style switching parameters for positive feedback 
trading and negative feedback trading, respectively; 

1 , 

2 , 

3 , 

4 , and 

1 , 

2 , 

3 , 

4  as the positive 
and negative switching parameters for lags less than 3 months, between 4 and 6 months, between 7 and 9, and 
10 and 12 months, respectively; Log(Agei) is the log of the age of the fund; Log(TNAi) is the log of the 
beginning of period size of the fund; Turnoveri is the median share turnover of the fund; and TERi is the total 
expense ratio of the fund. In each regression we include dummy variables to control for the stated fund style 
(not reported). We report White corrected t-statistics in parentheses. We indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, by *, **, and ***, respectively.    
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Figure 1. Unconditional Loadings on the Different Investment Styles 
  
Exposure to Large-Value      Exposure to Large-Growth 
  
Exposure to Small-Value      Exposure to Small-Growth 
Notes: Figure 1 displays the average loadings to the four benchmark portfolios (y-axis) within the 12 fund classes (x-axis), estimated from Equation (4). 
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Figure 2. Scatter Plot of Profit Difference versus Weight: Oppenheimer 
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Notes: Figure 2 depicts a scatter plot of the profit difference (x-axis) versus the weight (y-axis) for the 
Oppenheimer fund, for both the size-switching and the book-to-market switching. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Time Series of Profit Differences and Weights: Oppenheimer 
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Notes: Figure 3 gives the time-series of the profit differences and the weights for the Oppenheimer Funds. 
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Figure 4. Time Series of Conditional Exposures witβi
k
: Oppenheimer 
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Notes: Figure 4 displays the conditional exposures, given by witβi
k
, to the four benchmark portfolios. 
 
 
